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Humanae Vitae and After
George H. Duggan, S.M.
Writing six months after the appearance of Humanae Vitae, Christopher Derrick said he thought the
encyclical would probably not have
any long-term consequences of a
dramatic nature. So far his forecast has been verified. The Church
has not been rent by open schism,
and although there have been some
notable defections occasioned by
this issue, most of those who have
rejected the papal teaching have
contented themselves with "responsible dissent," while remaining within the visible communion
of the Church.
Nonetheless, the past four years
have witnessed some interesting
developments in the realm of ethical theory - developments which
could h<l ve been foreseen by the
observer with some training in philosophy. For, as Gilson has pointed
out, once we have adopted a phil-

osophical principle, we are no longer at liberty to think as we might
wish, for the subsequent development of our thought, if we are to be
consistent, is dictated by the principle.
The central argument of Humanae Vitae is that contraception is intrinsically evil because it is opposed
to the natural law and consequently
is never lawful for any reason whatsoever, since we may never do evil
even to achieve the most praiseworthy of ends.
Those who rejected this very clear
teaching did so on a variety of
grounds. Some argued that Christian morality is not concerned with
material conformity to physiological processes but with intentions,
and hence it would not matter if,
in individual acts of marital intercourse, artificial means of preventing conception were employed, pro-
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vided the partners did n6t adopt a
"contraceptive mentality." Ot!1ers
appealed to the authority of those
whom Father Richard McCormick
has described as "established theologians," who publicly and almost
immediately voiced their "sincere
and responsible dissent" from the
papal teaching. I
Moral Insights

Others appealed to the moral
insights of the faithful, of whom
great numbers had found that the
use of contraceptives contributed
to the happiness and stability of
their marriages and seemed so
clearly justified by their circumstances as to cause no qualms of
conscience. Since they, no less than
the clergy, are under the guidance
of the Spirit of truth, their witness
must be taken seriously as pointing
to a true development of Christian
thought on this question.
Finally, it was argued that God
has given man the power and the
duty, through the creative capacity
of human reason, to actuate his
own personal nature. Since this nature is not something static but is
subject to the same evolutionary
development as the rest of creation,
it is right and proper for man to
make use of the means that modern science has provided to achieve
a fuller human life, making it more
fully human by bringing conception, hitherto the sport of instinct
and chance, under the dominion
of reason.
This last argument, based on an
evolutionary conception of morality, has been developed by St. John-
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Stevas in his book, The Agonizing
Choice. He writes:
"The implicit rejection of the evolutionary in man's affairs is one of the most surprising features of the Encyclical . Man,
nature, reason, are all treated as though
they were static not dynamic concepts,
yet, by definition, reason should conform
to the level of knowledge reached in contemporary developed societies. . . . It
would be strange indeed if in this new
world, evolving at unprecedented speed,
morals alone were to remain static and not
be subject to change. Morality must change
and evolve since it represents man's response to other men in a state of bio~ul
tural evolution. Accordingly, human nature, while it has certain fixed elements,
contains others which are subject to continuous change. The pace of change today
in the relationship of man and woman appears to be especially rapid." 2

It is not surprising to find that
St. John-Stevas, after propounding
this evolutionary view of morality,
goes on a few pages later to argue
for the lawfulness of direct sterilization for contraceptive purposes
when the good of the individual
or the family requires the avoidance of further pregnancies.
Right to Life

He draws the line, however, at
abortion. No matter how much the
right to life has been violated in
our time, we must, he contends,
maintain belief in the principle
that man's right to life is sacred
and inviolable. 3 But it is hard
to see what answer he could make
to a person who was arguing for a
"liberalization" of the Church's
teaching on abortion on the ground
that this change is required if we
are to bring Catholic thinking into
line with "the level of knowledge
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of contemporary developed societies" - for it is a commonplace
that in these developed societies,
the lawfulness of abortion in certain cases is taken for granted.
Where St. lohn-Stevas has balked
at accepting the logical conclusion
implied in his principle that morality must be dynamic, other thinkers
have been less hesitant. A notable
example is Daniel Callahan. From
arguing for the lawfulness of contraception, he has gone on to justify
abortion. The principle he evokes
is wide-ranging indeed, for it
amounts to a claim that man in
making his ethical judgments is
absolutely autonomous. He writes:
"Contraception, abortion, euthanasia,
medical experimentation and the prolongation of life are all problems which fall
totally within the sphere of human rules
and judgments." 4

Whether Callahan's book is an
expression of the "best contemporary wisdom" and falls within the
ambit of "the responsible theological literature of the past year or
so," to which Father McCormick
has referred, 5 I do not know.
But obviously, when it is a question of the wisdom of a contemporary thinker or the responsibility of
a theologian, there is room for a
difference of opinion. One may
reasonably ask: How responsible
is a theologian who will allow
abortion when the Church has always condemned this as a violation of the right to life, most recently and in the strongest terms
at Vatican II? 6
Clearly there has been a radical
shift in a good deal of Catholic
ethical thinking in recent years. For
many, this shift has been a welcome
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change. Thus Warren T.
writes:

Reich

"In the past 16 years Catholic moral
theology has undergone a profound renaissance. It is now more centered on the
person of Christ, emphasizes the law of
love in man's personal response to God,
acknowledges that the moral life depends
on a process of growth, and admits the
uniqueness and significance of the situation in which man makes each of his moral
decisions." 7

Underlying Causes

What, we may inquire, are the
underlying causes of this profound
change? On the theological level,
there is a certain impatience with
the concept that the ecclesiastical
magisterium has the right to lay
down the law on issues where the
natural law is involved. As Warren Reich puts it, more and more
Christians "do not want to be put
down with authoritarian dicta," 8
but want to solve their moral problems by means of their enlightened conscience.
On the philosophical level, the
cause is the rejection by great numbers of Thomistic metaphysics and
in particular the doctrine of Moderate Realism regarding the value
of our universal concepts. If we
change our metaphysics, this cannot
but have an effect on our thinking
in ethics, for ethical questions are
not discussed in a philosophical
vacuum. Plato makes this clear in
The Republic, where he shows
that if we are to answer the question posed at the beginning of the
dialogue, "What is a good man?"
we must engage in a metaphysical
discussion of the nature of good-
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ness and explain the goodness of
the good man in terms of his relation to the Supreme Good.
To take a question much discussed in our day, the validity or
otherwise of Situationism, we find
that before we can deal with this
ethical problem, we must face the
more fundamental question: Can
we talk sensibly about human nature as such? To this question the
Thomist philosopher answers in
the affirmative, the Situationist in
the negative. Situationism in ethics had its foundation in the Nominalist view that all we can really
know is the individual human being, so that our ethical judgments
can only be about the way a particular individual should behave In
his concrete circumstances.
Moral Absolutes

If, on the other hand, we adopt
the Thomistic view that we can
make valid affirmations about
human nature as such, we are in
a position to assert that there is a
natural moral law which applies,
without exception, to all in whom
human nature is found. The content of this moral law is the " moral
absolutes," to which Father McCormick refers, and they extend
much further than he is prepared
to allow, vis., to such items as that
"human life must be respected" and
"all patients are to be treated justly." 9 Among these moral absolutes are the prohibition of adultery, abortion and contraception.
The infringement of these prohibitions is never lawful because it
would be contrary to the natural
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law which is itself a participation
in, and reflection of, the eternal
law by which God as the Author
of nature directs all creatures to
their respective ends. Because
such actions are opposed to the
natural law and so to the eternal
law, they are always intrinsically
evil and objectively sinful.
To describe these precepts of
the natural law as "a static code
of obligatory precepts," as Warren
Reich does,)O is to misconceive
their nature. In the first place, they
are essentially dynamic, as they
have to do with the direction of
man to his Last End. Secondly,
they are not mere positive laws,
as the term "obligatory precepts"
would suggest, but flow from the
nature of man and derive their
obligatory force from man's supreme obligation, expressed in the
law of love, the First Commandment of the law.
Law of Love

But the law of love, which demands a personal response to God,
though paramount, is clearly unable
to provide an answer to specific moral questions, to determine whether
this or that action is truly an expression of love or otherwise. Is contraceptive intercourse, for example,
really an expression of honest love
or is it, as Christopher Derrick has
maintained, obviously dishonest,
since it is "the enactment or pretense of a total surrender which is
- in point of fact - very carefully prevented from taking place"?))
That question can be answered, as
Pope Paul answered it, only by
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considering the nature of the act
which is essentially, though not exclusively, procreative 12 and going on from there to determine
what are the demands of the natural law. To attempt to answer the
question when one has discarded
the principle of natural law. is to
abandon all hope of rationally justifying the prohibition of such vices
as sodomy, as the London Tablet
admitted in an editorial. 13
It leads also, as we have remarked, to the abandonment of
the absolute prohibition of abortion. Germain Grisez some years
ago argued to the inevitability of
this development, but his views
were not well received. He wrote:
"When I pointed out in 1964-1968 that
the dissenting position on contraception
would also justify abortion, I was attacked
as deficient in the rudimentary skills of
logic." 14

Recent developments have shown
that his logic was not so rudimentary after all, for to quote him
once more:
" It had now become clearer and clearer
that to set oneself against the start of human life is to begin to set oneself against
human life itself." 15

There is an inner strength in a
position taken on some moral issue such as abortion when this position is one item in a system
marked by philosophical consistency. This strength is lacking, I
suggest, when an opponent of abortion is prepared to allow the lawfulness of contraception, for when
one has jettisoned one's principles
on one issue, they are no longer
available for defending one's position on another. The moral for the
theologian surely is that it would

62

be the part of Christian wisdom
to take the encyclical, an extremely solemn and weighty exercise of
papal authority, as it stands, rejecting as contrary to the natural moral
law such aberrations as abortion,
direct sterilization and contraception. Only thus will he be able to
provide an intellectually respectable defense of man's dignity, not
only as a Christian but as a human
being.
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